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Class Actions and State Authority
Samuel Issacharoff*
As experiments with class actions spread to more distant shores,
especially in countries of civil law backgrounds, a recurring question
arises: what is the relation of the private class action to the customary
regulatory power of the state? The response offered here is that, in fact,
the class action stands in three different postures to state authority: as a
direct challenge, as a complement, and as a rival. Recent class action
cases in the U.S. are analyzed to examine these three functions and to
give a distinct justification for each. At bottom, each justification turns
on a contested commitment to a diversity of regulatory authority—here
termed “regulatory pluralism”—that lends coherence to all three forms
of interaction between the state and private authority, claiming the
mantle of the “private attorney general.”

* Reiss Professor of Constitutional Law, New York University School of Law. My thanks to
Fabrizzio Cafaggi, Troy McKenzie, Arthur Miller and Emanuel Towfigh for pushing me on the
ideas presented here, for which I bear the responsibility. Earlier versions were presented at the
Scuola Superiore della Pubblica Amministrazione in Rome, and at the International Conference
of Procedural Law in Buenos Aires. I benefitted from critical commentary at each setting. Maria
Ponomarenko provided indispensable research assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
Even as class actions spread beyond their American home medium,1
they remain a source of contestation in every legal system. Some of the
disputes are over technical issues of class structure, such as whether the
opt-out form of the American class action infringes individual
autonomy, 2 or whether the customary cost-shifting rules of continental
legal systems should be modified to facilitate collective actions. 3 In the
hands of lawyers and judges, these technical issues come to the fore as
contested procedural matters in the administration of collective
litigation. But the technical debates ill-capture the fundamental source
of tension in class action law. That tension, as set out below, is
presented most acutely in civil law countries, but an examination of
American developments shows that even the country with the most
established class action practices is not immune.

1. See Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey P. Miller, Will Aggregate Litigation Come to Europe?,
62 VAND. L. REV. 179 (2009) (evaluating European class action reforms in light of the American
experience with mass litigation); Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregate Litigation across the Atlantic
and the Future of American Exceptionalism, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1, 3 (2009) (noting that European
countries have “come to embrace civil procedure reforms to authorize aggregate litigation”). See
also RICARDO LUIS LORENZETTI, JUSTICIA COLECTIVA (2010) (tracing the development of
Argentinian class actions); FRANCISCO VERBIC, PROCESOS COLECTIVOS (2007) (setting forth the
jurisprudential foundations in Argentine law for the development of aggregate litigation);
LEANDRO J. GIANNINI, LA TUTELA COLECTIVA DE DERECHOS INDIVIDUALES HOMOGÉNEOS
(2007) (developing Argentine law in context of undifferentiated individual claims); Deborah R.
Hensler, The Future of Mass Litigation: Global Class Actions and Third-Party Litigation
Funding, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 306, 307 (2011) (“[A]t least twenty-one countries . . . have
adopted some type of class action . . . .”); Antonio Gidi, Class Actions in Brazil—A Model for
Civil Law Countries, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 311, 326–31 (2003) (providing an overview of class
actions in Brazil, the most developed of any civil law country); CASSIO SCARPINELLA BUENO,
DIREITO PROCESSUAL CIVIL 197–317 (2010) (providing a systematic overview of Brazilian class
action law and the use of the public prosecutor for organizing collective litigation); W.A.
BOGART ET AL., CLASS ACTIONS IN CANADA: A NATIONAL PROCEDURE IN A MULTIJURISDICTIONAL SOCIETY?, GLOBAL CLASS ACTIONS EXCHANGE (2007), available at
http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/documents/Canada_National_Report.pdf
(presenting a general overview of Canadian class action law).
2. See, e.g., Christopher Hodges, What Are People Trying to Do in Resolving Mass Issues,
How Is It Going, and Where Are We Headed?, 622 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 330,
341 (2009) (“This debate has acted as a brake on the adoption of collective action mechanisms in
countries such as Austria, France, and Germany.”); S.I. Strong, Enforcing Class Arbitration in the
International Sphere: Due Process and Public Policy Concerns, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1, 22
(2008) (“[C]ivil law nations interpret a class action—even with an opt-out provision—as an
infringement on a non-representative plaintiff’s right to decide when and how to exercise his or
her right to a cause of action.”). See generally Remo Caponi, Collective Redress in Europe:
Current Developments of “Class Action” Suits in Italy (2012) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract _id=2100448 (discussing new Italian
regulation on class action suits).
3. See Gidi, supra note 1, at 340 (explaining that in Brazil, for example, unsuccessful class
action plaintiffs are exempted from the traditional “loser pays” fee-shifting regime).
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At its simplest, and most compelling, the class action is a centralizing
device that overcomes a variety of collective action problems. 4 This is
clearest when the class action is directed to negative value claims whose
potential legal merit cannot justify the transactional values of pursuing
legal redress. 5 But it is just as compelling when individual claims for
redress arise from a broad harm whose effects are undifferentiated
among its victims, as in the classic civil rights cases that formed the
basis for modern Rule 23 jurisprudence. 6
When viewed as a procedural device to overcome collective action
problems in mass society, the class action is at once most
comprehensible and most problematic. The simple fact is that all
societies already possess an institution designed to overcome collective
action barriers to common security and the proper allocation of burdens
and resources: the state, in its most basic Hobbesian functions. 7 The
class action offers an alternative form of collective organization to the
state—without the elements of popular participation, political consent,
and electoral accountability that justify governmental authority in a
democracy. That delegation of collective authority to an institution
without the democratic pedigree of the state demands some justification,
especially in countries with the strong statist tradition emerging from
Roman law.
Ricardo Lorenzetti—the President of the Argentine Supreme Court
and the author of the transformative opinion in Argentine
jurisprudence—well captures the view of the class action as an
alternative to state monopoly control on collective action in Halabi v.
Poder Ejecutivo Nacional: 8
4. For example, bankruptcy proceedings provide an alternative mechanism for resolving
aggregate claims. See Troy A. McKenzie, Toward a Bankruptcy Model for Non-Class Aggregate
Litigation, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 960 (2012) (“[B]ankruptcy serves as a better model for
judging when to use, and how to order, nonclass aggregation of mass tort litigation.”).
5. Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 748 (5th Cir. 1996) (“The most compelling
rationale for finding superiority in a class action [is] the existence of a negative value suit . . . .”).
See also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985) (citing favorably the fact that
plaintiffs would have been unlikely to pursue individual claims, each averaging just $100).
6. See David Marcus, Flawed but Noble: Desegregation Litigation and Its Implications for the
Modern Class Action, 63 FLA. L. REV. 657, 661 (2011) (arguing that Rule 23 authors primarily
had desegregation suits in mind when they provided for mandatory class treatment under Rule
23(b)(2)).
7. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 89 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (noting
that absent the collective security afforded by the state—in the hypothesized state of nature—
“there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain”). See also Samuel
Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 337,
338 (describing “the class action mechanism as fundamentally a centralizing device designed to
accomplish some of the same functions as performed by the state”).
8. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice]
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Collective actions are a great support for the institutional design of the
country because they are mechanisms that allow civil society to
participate in the state of law. If ordinary citizens participate in the
life of the country, there [are] . . . fewer centralized decisions in a
country with a long tradition of centralized decisionmaking. 9

In some countries, the tension between state authority and the class
action’s collective empowerment plays out in debates over entrusting
only state-designated non-governmental organizations (NGO), such as
registered consumer advocacy groups, to bring a class action—as in
early legislation in Brazil and Italy. 10 But, perhaps because class
actions are by now well-rooted in American law, the debate over the
relationship between class actions and state authority is paradoxically
less well developed in this country.
Following the invitation of President Lorenzetti to ground the use of
class actions in a conception of “regulatory pluralism,” this Article will
use the idea of multiple sources of regulatory power to explore the
relationship between class actions and state authority. 11 Class actions
24/2/2009, “Halabi c. Poder Ejecutivo Nacional” Ley 25.873, decreto 1563/042/amparo ley
16.986 (finding a right to collective action directly under the Argentine constitution and adopting
a mechanism for prosecution of consumer class action). For a discussion of the role of Halabi in
establishing a procedural route for the vindication of what are termed “individual homogeneous”
rights, in accordance with Brazilian usage, see JOSÉ MARÍA SALGADO, TUTELA INDIVIDUAL
HOMOGÉNEA 103–11 (2011).
9. The passage from which this English translation derives reads as follows:
Las acciones colectivas son un gran aporte al diseño institucional del país porque son
mecanismos que provee el Estado de Derecho para que la sociedad civil participe. Y si
el ciudadano común participa en la vida del país, entonces hay más control, más
debate, hay discusión y transparencia, menos oscilaciones pendulares y más equilibrio
de fuerzas, menos decisiones centralizadas en un país con una larga tradición de
decisiones centralizadas.
Ricardo Lorenzetti, La acción de clase es un aporte al diseño institucional del país, PORTAL DEL
CONSUMIDOR PROTECTORA, http://www.protectora.org.ar/legislacion/la-accion-de-clase-es-unaporte-al-diseno-institucional-del-pais/1453/ (last visited June 23, 2012).
10. Lei No. 8.078, de 11 de Setembro de 1990 CÓDIGO DE PROTEÇÃO E DEFESA DO
CONSUMIDOR [C.D.C.] [Consumer Code], art. 82 (Braz.), translated in Gidi, supra note 1, at 406
(limiting collective standing to government officials and public interest associations); Decreto
Legislativo 6 Settembre 2005, n.206, in CODICE DEL CONSUMO [Consumer Code] art. 140 bis
(It.), as discussed in Caponi, supra note 2, at 8. On the ability of such groups to serve the role of
consumer protection adequately, compare Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 1, at 194–97 (noting
potential conflicts of interest between nonprofit organizations and the consumers they represent),
with John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously, 110 COLUM. L.
REV. 288, 347 (2010) (arguing that because nonprofit organizations stake their “reputational
capital” on the outcome of litigation, they are likely to deliver “loyal and competent
performance”).
11. Regulatory pluralism is generally used to connote the overlap of regulatory powers
between formal state functions and private associations that may set professional standards or in
other ways fill gaps in formal state coordination. See Fabrizio Cafaggi, Rethinking Private
Regulation in the European Regulatory Space, in REFRAMING SELF-REGULATION IN EUROPEAN
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exist in fundamentally different relations to state power, at times as a
direct antagonist, at times as overt or tacit ally, and at times independent
of direct governmental involvement.
Examined through this
framework, recent class action cases flesh out some observations about
the political economy of non-state collective actions.
I. THE CLASS ACTION AS A CHALLENGE TO STATE AUTHORITY
Central to the reforms of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in 1966 was a desire to facilitate the successful prosecution
of civil rights claims. 12 The language and structure of Rule 23(b)(2) is
framed in terms of the uniformity of the defendant’s treatment of a
group of persons—what would later be framed as the cohesiveness of
the affected class. 13 That uniformity, in turn, would provide the basis
for declaratory or injunctive relief that would condemn the defendant’s
across-the-board conduct.
As straightforward and compelling as this account is, it is nonetheless
paradoxical. It is precisely the uniformity of the conduct, as with the
segregation of the school system in Topeka, Kansas, that makes class
certification both proper under Rule 23(b)(2) and unnecessary. What
difference would it have made had Brown v. Board of Education 14 gone
forward as just an individual case brought in the name of either Oliver
Brown, the putative lead plaintiff, or his daughter Linda Brown, the
actually excluded schoolchild? Any declaration of unconstitutionality,
or even more certainly an injunction against the continued operation of
the segregated system as to the Brown family, could not possibly have
been confined to the Brown family’s claims alone. Further, class
certification might have actually worked to the disadvantage of the
challenge to school segregation. Were the first case to stumble in its
theory or evidentiary presentation, res judicata would not serve as a bar
to subsequent, better formulated challenges, unless the class were
certified. 15
Two possible justifications for class treatment are readily apparent.
PRIVATE LAW 3, 36–38 (Fabrizio Cafaggi ed., 2006) (focusing on a single regulatory relationship
as opposed to monopolistic private regulatory power). Here, I use this term one step further to
include the incremental regulatory effect of litigation.
12. See Marcus, supra note 6, at 704–06 (noting that authors focused extensively on
desegregation suits in considering various drafts of Rule 23(b)(2)).
13. Rule 23(b)(2) reads: “The party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief
is appropriate respecting the class as a whole . . . .” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).
14. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
15. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008) (clarifying that class-wide suits must conform
to the procedural requirements of Rule 23 to have preclusive effect).
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First, class actions take pressure off the individual plaintiffs in
politically or socially charged litigation. For the same reason the
NAACP Legal Defense Fund chose to proceed in the name of Oliver
Brown rather than his minor daughter, so too the fact of having many
named plaintiffs acting on behalf of a veritable army of claimants
diminishes the vulnerability of individual plaintiffs precisely because
they become largely interchangeable.
Second, and more central to the present inquiry, the anticipated scope
of Rule 23(b)(2) class actions puts them on a collision course with the
political choices of democratically elected governmental authority. This
problem is more specific than the ever-present consternations over
countermajoritarian judicial review. Rather, the classic civil rights class
action directed at discriminatory state action is characterized precisely
by a claim that the majoritarian processes have placed the class at risk
of harm by the legislated choices of majoritarian constituencies. On this
view, the certification of a class conforms to the central insight of the
renowned Carolene Products footnote four. 16 The Rule 23(a) factors,
in effect, are a proxy for the discreteness of a cohesive class of
plaintiffs, and the Rule 23(b)(2) requirement of being subject to a
uniformly applied policy or course of conduct establishes that the class
is treated as distinct from the population at large—an operationalization
of the footnote’s insularity requirement. 17 The key to Rule 23(b)(2) is
that the uniformity of treatment across the affected population defines
the class. 18 In turn, the Rule 23(a) prerequisites for class certification
require that the group subject to distinct state conduct be substantial 19
and that the legal claim substantially addresses the asserted harm
suffered by the entirety of the class. 20 When combined, the formal
16. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). In footnote four, the
Court set out the basis for modern judicial review by suggesting that certain categories of
legislation may be subject to more exacting scrutiny. Id. The Court recognized that it might at
some point have to apply more searching review to “legislation which restricts those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation.” Id.
In the most famous passage of the footnote, the Court added that stricter scrutiny might also apply
when “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities . . . tends seriously to curtail the operation
of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities.” Id.
17. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) (the opposing party’s actions or inaction must “apply generally to
the class”).
18. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2557 (2011) (holding that Rule
23(b)(2) applies only when “conduct is such that it can be enjoined or declared unlawful only as
to all of the class members or as to none of them”) (quoting Richard A. Nagareda, Class
Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 132 (2009)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
19. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1).
20. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (clarifying that the common question “must be of such a nature
that it is capable of class-wide resolution—which means that determination of its truth or falsity
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criteria of the rules and the resulting class definition set forth the
discreteness and insularity of the affected population.
Viewed in this fashion, the Rule 23(b)(2) class action is a claim of
political disregard by the majority for the particularized interests of the
minority. 21 The final passage of the Carolene Products footnote, too
often overlooked in favor of the evocative concepts of discreteness and
insularity, makes this point clear: “[W]hether prejudice against discrete
and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously
to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.” 22
The countermajoritarian force of the class action as a challenge to
governmental conduct is still more apparent in a recent massive class
action, also denominated Brown. In Brown v. Plata, 23 the Supreme
Court confronted the most significant class action litigation of the past
decade, yet one whose procedural contours appear so obvious as to not
even register as a “class action case.” At issue was the persistent
overcrowding of California state prisons, the subject of ongoing
litigation challenging various manifestations of desperate prison
conditions. 24 The named petitioners claimed medical and psychological
traumas as a result of the breakdown of basic prison functions. But the
manifested harms were merely symptomatic of the brute fact of
overcrowding of the state’s prisons. Despite prior determinations of
unconstitutional conditions, 25 California continued to incarcerate—
furthered by its punitive sentencing policies, 26 including “three strikes
will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke”);
Nagareda, supra note 18, at 132 (arguing that “[w]hat matters to class certification” under Rule
23 is “the capacity of a class-wide proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the
resolution of the litigation”).
21. In its most extreme and unstable form, this minority is so localized as to be the
problematic “class of one.” In its most recent incarnation, this claim of equal protection disregard
for such particularized interests divided the Seventh Circuit in Del Marcelle v. Brown County
Corp., 680 F.3d 887 (7th Cir. 2012) (producing a three-way split on the proper standard of review
for class of one claims).
22. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
23. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011).
24. Id. at 1922 (noting that California’s prison conditions had been the subject of “years of
litigation”).
25. See Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1316 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (finding that state
officials acted with deliberate indifference toward inmates’ mental health needs in violation of the
Eighth Amendment); Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No. C01-1351 TEH, 2005 WL 2932243, at *1
(N.D. Cal. May 10, 2005) (appointing a Receiver to supervise the prison system’s medical
facilities after finding persistent violations of inmates’ Eighth Amendment rights).
26. In 1977, California enacted a Determinate Sentencing Law (“DSL”), which limited
judicial discretion and mandated higher sentences in a variety of circumstances. 1976 Cal. Stat.
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and you’re out” 27—to the point that its inmate population reached over
150,000, housed in prisons built to hold 80,000. 28 As the incarcerated
population grew, the basic systems of health and security broke down,
with alarming incidences of mental illness, violence, and disease. 29
The need for class treatment in Brown v. Plata may be readily
discerned from the perspective of crafting a remedy. Each member of
the class had been duly sentenced and properly subject to incarceration,
leaving aside the inevitable individual appeals and habeas proceedings
that may have been pending. No prisoner could claim an individual
right to release from prison as a consequence of the overcrowding.
Damages might be awarded for claims of severe harm, as with the
named plaintiffs in Brown, but damage awards to prisoners are
notoriously sparing. 30 Whatever the cumulated total of damages awards
to individual prisoners, the incentives to the state would have been to
allow the problem to fester rather than confront the harsh consequences
of state policy. It was simply cheaper—economically and politically—
to pay off the worst abused prisoners in a dysfunctional system rather
than have to confront the structural calamity of the California state
prisons. Absent unitary treatment through a class action, no prisoner
would have a claim as to the systemic violations caused by
overcrowding, but only standing to seek legal redress for his or her
individual harms.
5140 (codified as amended at CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(a)). In part as a result of its more
stringent sentencing regime, the state’s prison population increased more than sevenfold between
1980 and 2007. Joan Petersilla, California’s Correctional Paradox of Excess and Deprivation,
37 CRIME & JUST. 207, 209 (2008). The Supreme Court struck down the DSL in 2007. See
Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 293 (2007) (finding that the statute violates defendants’
Sixth Amendment rights to a jury trial by permitting “the judge, not the jury, to find the facts
permitting an upper term sentence”).
27. Three Strikes Law, CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West 2003). The Supreme Court has
heretofore rejected Eighth Amendment challenges to three-strikes laws. See, e.g., Lockyer v.
Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 66 (2003) (upholding defendant’s sentence of two consecutive twentyfive-year terms for shop lifting, his third felony offense). But see Ramirez v. Castro, 365 F.3d
755, 768 (9th Cir. 2004) (overturning three-strikes sentence for a third shoplifting offense as
disproportional in violation of the Eighth Amendment).
28. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1923.
29. The record revealed appalling instances of abuse and neglect due to overcrowding.
Suicidal inmates awaiting treatment were at times “held for prolonged periods in telephone-booth
sized cages without toilets.” Id. at 1924. Inmates suffering from physical ailments likewise
experienced prolonged delays: in one facility, “[a] prisoner with severe abdominal pain died after
a five-week delay in referral to a specialist.” Id. at 1925. A doctor testified that “extreme
departures from the standard of care were ‘widespread.’” Id.
30. See Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1626 (2003) (noting
that even before the 1995 Prison Litigation Reform Act, which raised the bar for recovery,
“plaintiffs were successful in only a small minority of inmate cases filed, and even the successful
cases usually garnered quite small damages”).
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Further, a prisoner’s status impedes any meaningful recourse to the
political process. California disenfranchises convicted felons during
their incarceration or parole, with felons constituting the substantial
majority of the population in the state prisons. 31 The inability to vote is
really only a formality that confirms the outcast status of violent
criminals who make up the bulk of the prison population. On the issue
of greatest concern to the prison population—the overcrowding and
oppression of the prisons themselves—prisoners are unlikely to
compete successfully for scarce state resources against schools, roads,
parks, and the services consumed by the law-abiding, voting population.
Moreover, prisoners face the concentrated and effective political force
of the correction workers’ union, a powerful force that, through
lobbying and extraordinary campaign contributions, has pressed for
harsher sentences—a major source of overcrowding. 32
Ultimately, the Supreme Court upheld a lower court order requiring
the immediate reduction of the California prison population by 40,000
inmates, until such time as its prisons hold no more than 137.5% of
capacity. 33 It is inconceivable that the paralyzed California political
system could have mustered the will to resolve the intolerable
conditions inside its prisons, nor is it conceivable that, absent a
mechanism for collective redress, any meaningful legal remedy could
have been fashioned in one-by-one litigation. The question of class
certification legitimately placed the Court in a role of public
superintendent over the rights of inmates. This, in turn, allowed the
extraordinary and controversial remedy of ordering the release of
prisoners duly convicted of crimes, in effect putting felons back on the
street. 34
Viewed against the backdrop of political power, the class action in a
case such as Brown v. Plata serves as the legitimate and efficient
31. JOSEPH M. HAYES, PUB. POL’Y INST. OF CAL., CALIFORNIA’S CHANGING PRISON
POPULATION 1 (2012), available at http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/jtf/JTF_PrisonsJTF.pdf.
32. The California Correctional Peace Officers Association ranked fifth among the top-ten
contributors to independent expenditures committees between 2001 and 2006. CAL. FAIR
POLITICAL PRACTICES COMM’N, INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES FOR LEGISLATIVE AND
STATEWIDE CANDIDATES 4 (2008), available at http://www.fppc.ca.gov/meeting_slides/20080
214/Presentation-Final.pdf. Harsher sentencing laws are reflected in an aging prison population,
with prisoners aged fifty years or older now comprising nineteen percent of the state’s inmates.
HAYES, supra note 31, at 1.
33. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1945–46.
34. A ringing dissent by Justice Scalia described the approved remedy as “the most radical
injunction issued by a court in our Nation’s history.” Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1950 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). The District Court permitted the State to devise its own plan to reduce overcrowding
within two years. Id. at 1943. Pending appeal, California initiated a program to transfer
“thousands” of prisoners to county jails. Id.
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mobilizing device for statutory or constitutional challenges to public
authorities, particularly on behalf of those who have no effective
prospect of political mobilization to correct untoward public behavior.
II. THE CLASS ACTION AS A COMPLEMENT TO STATE AUTHORITY
Unlike the origins of Rule 23(b)(2) as a form of channeling and
legitimating challenges to governmental authority, the need for judicial
efficiency in the prosecution of related claims for recompense prompted
the 1966 innovation of the Rule 23(b)(3) class action. 35 As with all
public goods, the more diffuse the related interests become, the more
likely there will be insufficient investment to secure common benefits. 36
Here again, the class action needs to confront the role of the state as the
primary guarantor of public goods. A key justification of public
ordering is the risk of underproduction of undifferentiated, commonly
utilized goods, such as national defense, environmental protection,
maintenance of water quality, and a host of goods that are difficult to
underwrite through private user fees. The state, through its common
capacity to pool costs and benefits through the taxing and regulatory
power, is the prime mechanism to overcome the “tragedy of the
commons” 37 that leads to suboptimal societal results.
Class actions address the public goods dilemma in two ways. First,
by pooling the stakes in the case, the class action balances the incentives
for investment in litigation between a repeat-play defendant and a host
of one-time actors, as with the relation between a mass marketer and an
undifferentiated group of individual consumers. While the mass
producer of goods or services can amortize the cost of defense across
numerous transactions, the sheer cost and bother of pursuing claims
over a single consumer transaction will deter any rational actor from
seeking legal redress. To quote Judge Richard Posner, “only a lunatic
or a fanatic sues for $30.” 38 Indeed, overcoming the “negative value”
35. On the history of Rule 23(b)(3), see Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and
Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the “Class Action Problem,” 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 669–70
(1979) (arguing that the 1966 revisions to Rule 23(b)(3) were not intended to revolutionize classaction practice, but merely to create “a more effective procedural tool”); John K. Rabiej, The
Making of Class Action Rule 23—What Were We Thinking?, 24 MISS. C. L. REV. 323, 335–36
(2005) (emphasizing that considerations of efficiency and access shaped modern Rule 23(b)(3)).
See also William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General” Is—and Why It Matters,
57 VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2146–49 (2004) (arguing that Rule 23(b)(3) permits class action
plaintiffs to supplement public regulation by acting as “private attorneys general”).
36. See Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT.
387, 388 (1954) (explaining the “pure theory of government expenditure” on collective
consumption goods).
37. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244–45 (1968).
38. Carnegie v. Household Int’l Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004).
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associated with seeking relief is offered as one of the prime
justifications for the small-value class action. 39 Second, pooling claims
creates a common reservoir of recovery that may induce an agent to take
the reins on behalf of the class. The Supreme Court has acknowledged
this, stating:
The policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to
overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the
incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or
her rights. A class action solves this problem by aggregating the
relatively paltry potential recoveries into something worth someone’s
(usually an attorney’s) labor. 40

The modern form of the class action subsidizes private attorneys in
overcoming these collective action barriers. 41 Common fund recoveries
are an important inducement for entrepreneurial attorneys to seek out
promising cases and invest in them accordingly.
Also, the
characteristically American form of the opt-out class action further
reduces the transaction costs of prosecuting on behalf of a large, diffuse
group. Under Rule 23(c), reasonable efforts must be made to provide
notice of the action to the affected population. 42 But the burden of
exclusion falls on the class members who will be bound unless
affirmatively choosing to opt out. As a result, class representatives and,
more significantly, class attorneys are spared the expense of having to
attempt to contract on a one-by-one basis with all class members—a
costly effect of an opt-in system of representation.
If the state is to subsidize private actors to assume the role of public
agents—what the law describes as the private attorney general
model 43—then why should the state not assume the role of public
guardian itself? Access to justice is itself a costly public good and the
availability of relatively low-cost, private attorney general actions
depends on the infrastructure of courts, liberal discovery, and the
enforceability of judgments. In many areas of law, the subsidy provided
by the opt-out class action is sufficient to induce private action that
either makes further investment in public enforcement an unnecessary
39. See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 748 (5th Cir. 1996) (“The most compelling
rationale for finding superiority in a class action [is] the existence of a negative value suit.”).
40. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (quoting Mace v. Van Ru
Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 2007)).
41. See Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating Subsidies and
Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2119,
2145–47 (2000) (arguing that modern class action rules help subsidize private enforcement of
public interests).
42. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2).
43. See generally Rubenstein, supra note 35 (explaining the role of private attorney generals
in class action suits).
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public expenditure or proves to be more efficient in ferreting out
wrongdoing that directs public administrative action.
The result is a form of public-private collaboration in which the
private class action augments public administration of the laws.
Antitrust law provides the best example. The broad channel of antitrust
actions begins as public enforcements, either civil or criminal, brought
by the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice.44
Typically, these cases seek injunctive relief, sometimes civil fines or
criminal penalties, but almost never restitution or compensation to the
victims of unlawful action. Instead, that task is left to private
enforcement through the “private attorney general” actions brought by
private lawyers challenging the consequences of the anticompetitive
activity and seeking recovery for the class. Notably, one of the more
notorious of recent antitrust cases set the stage for the elevation of
pleading standards beyond the long established “notice pleading”
requirement for initiating a civil lawsuit. 45 In Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, the Supreme Court began the modern trend toward
heightened pleading requirements that satisfy a plausibility standard of
initial judicial scrutiny. 46 For present purposes, it is worth noting only
that Twombly was among the subset of antitrust class actions in which
private parties sought to both establish the liability for the underlying
conduct and recover for the damages. The Supreme Court upheld a
dismissal for failure to state a plausible claim, something that would be
extremely hard to imagine if there had been a prior public prosecution
or civil action resulting in a finding of liability.
Although less of a cooperative venture, a similar overlap of private
and public enforcement appears in the securities fraud context. One
study by Professor Howell Jackson found that between 2002 and 2004,
44. See EINER ELHAUGE & DAMIEN GERADIN, GLOBAL ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS
21 (2007) (noting that private plaintiffs “may be able to benefit from the discovery the
government collected” and that “potential plaintiffs often lobby the government agencies to bring
the cases first”). An earlier study found that between 1973 and 1983, nearly a quarter of all
private claims were filed as “follow-on” cases to government enforcement actions. Thomas E.
Kauper & Edward A. Snyder, Private Antitrust Cases that Follow on Government Cases, in
PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION: NEW EVIDENCE, NEW LEARNING 329, 358 (Lawrence J. White
ed., 1988).
45. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957) (“[A] complaint should not be dismissed
for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”), abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double
Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 19 (2010) (arguing that Twombly
“transformed the function of a complaint . . . by imposing a more demanding standard that
requires a greater factual foundation than previously was required or originally intended”).
46. See 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2006) (holding that to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint
must plead sufficient facts “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level”).
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private class actions accounted for nearly forty percent of all sanctions
imposed on securities fraud defendants, despite overlapping jurisdiction
between private and public actions. 47 In light of the most recent wave
of financial dislocations, renewed attention has turned to the perceived
insufficiencies of private enforcement to deter misconduct. 48 As wellsummarized by Harvey Goldschmidt, former Commissioner of the SEC:
“Private enforcement is a necessary supplement to the work that the
[SEC] does. It is also a safety valve against the potential capture of the
agency by industry.” 49
Though the symbiotic relationship between public and private
enforcement is less apparent than in the antitrust context, private
securities fraud claims benefit from a strong doctrinal cost-savings
boost. All fraud cases require, as an element of proof of harm, evidence
that the purchaser relied on the deception that constitutes the fraud—
overt in the form of a misrepresentation or covert in the form of an
omission of critical information—in making the decision that led to her
losses. The best evidence of such detrimental reliance is the testimony
of the purchaser herself (even if it is prone to be self-serving after the
fact), especially in omission cases where the individual claim of reliance
constitutes a counterfactual about what would have happened under
untested circumstances.
The need for such direct testimony of fraud would doom all class
actions by eliminating the efficiency gains of common prosecution and
restoring all the transactional obstacles to small-value prosecutions.50
But such an inherited conception of common law fraud would presume
that modern capital markets operate as nothing more than an extended
series of contractual exchanges between individual buyers and sellers,
rendering the New York Stock Exchange an elaborate bazaar where
individual buyers and sellers haggle over the price of a putatively
antique rug.
Modern finance theory, not to mention common sense, casts a

47. See Howell E. Jackson, Variation in the Intensity of Financial Regulation: Preliminary
Evidence and Potential Implications, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 253, 280–81 (2007) (graphing U.S.
securities regulation enforcement actions in terms of both public and private actions).
48. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence
and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1536–38 (2006) (arguing that a greater share
of liability must be assigned to corporate managers and directors in order to achieve optimal
deterrence from securities class actions).
49. Stephen Labaton, Businesses Seek Protection on Legal Front, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2006,
at A1.
50. See Samuel Issacharoff, The Vexing Problem of Reliance in Consumer Class Actions, 74
TUL. L. REV. 1633, 1648 (2000) (“The modern securities class action would be impossible if such
reliance needed to be established on an individual basis . . . .”).
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skeptical account on this rendering of rapid-fire capital markets. In its
place, one may presume that “thick markets,” ones in which the traded
securities are fully fungible and the buyers and sellers are unknown to
each other, are “efficient” in the sense that transactions occur at the
market clearing price and not as a result of the exchange of private
communication among the transacting parties. 51 This is the “efficient
capital market hypothesis,” which posits that in thick and efficient
markets, all publicly available information will be incorporated into the
price of a stock. This then allows securities claims to be based on a
fraud on the market theory that presumes that all transactions are
affected by the market incorporation of material information that the
seller delivers to the market, as with improper claims in a prospectus or
misleading representations in public filings. 52
The ability to prove fraud through market activity has a direct bearing
on the prospect for private enforcement, in effect relieving private
actions of the transactional burden of establishing reliance through the
costly common law method of individual proof. 53 The substantive
law’s recognition of the efficiency gains realized by institutional actors
in thick capital markets is then matched by a procedural tool that
overcomes the collective action barrier to investors seeking redress in
parallel efficient fashion. Once relieved of the burden of showing
individually specific reliance in each transaction, the purchasers of
shares during a fixed period of time become interchangeable parts of a
market complex, differentiated not by their individual decision making,
but by the mechanical facts of the prices at which they bought or sold.
As summarized last Term by Chief Justice Roberts in Erica P. John
Fund v. Halliburton Co.: “Because the market ‘transmits information to
the investor in the processed form of a market price,’ we can assume . . .
51. See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work,
25 J. FIN. 383, 384 (1970) (“[I]n an efficient market prices ‘fully reflect’ available information.”);
Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV.
549, 567 (1984) (surveying the literature on the efficient capital market hypothesis and
identifying the mechanisms through which information may be incorporated into the market
price).
52. See Daniel R. Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases Involving
Actively Traded Securities, 38 BUS. LAW. 1, 10 (1982) (“Because the market is efficient,
investors who rely on a market price that is artificially inflated or depressed by fraudulent conduct
suffer an economic loss.”). One of the earliest formulations of the fraud on the market theory in a
securities class action appears in Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 906 (9th Cir. 1975)
(permitting class certification without individualized proof of loss causation on the ground that
“proof of subjective reliance on particular misrepresentations is unnecessary to establish a 10b-5
claim for a deception inflating the price of stock traded in the open market”).
53. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 223, 245 (1988) (“Requiring a plaintiff to show . . .
how he would have acted if omitted material information had been disclosed . . . would [impose]
an unnecessarily unrealistic evidentiary burden.”).
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that an investor relies on public misstatements whenever ‘he buys or
sells stock at the price set by the market.’” 54 In Halliburton, the Court
permitted investors to organize collectively as an opt-out class without
first proving that each individual investor’s losses from the decline in
stock prices resulted from the defendant’s misrepresentations, precisely
because such a requirement would have reduced market-based
collective claims to a series of individual exchanges. 55 The result
overturned an emerging trend in some lower courts that required
investors to prove loss causation in order to take advantage of the fraud
on the market presumption, thereby maintaining the economic viability
of private enforcement actions.
The antitrust and securities cases lie across a spectrum of
complementary public-private enforcement actions in which costeffective class action mechanisms buttress the limited collective
resources available to the state. The spectrum includes arrangements
whereby the state agency serves as the initial clearinghouse for
collective prosecution, permitting private actions only after state
authorities have decided not to sue directly, as with the screening role of
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission under Title VII. 56
Each setting offers a distinct, unique hybrid of public and private
enforcement, each organized to overcome the collective action barrier to
private individuals seeking redress on their own. 57 The public
dimension uses the forced collective action of the state; the private
dimension uses the voluntary private aggregation made possible by
liberal class action rules.
III. THE CLASS ACTION AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR
DIRECT STATE AUTHORITY
At the furthest remove from the idea of exclusive state regulatory
authority is the use of the class action as a form of regulatory authority
designed to be relatively independent of formal state administration.
54. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2185 (2011) (quoting
Levinson, 485 U.S. at 244).
55. Id. at 2183.
56. A party wishing to file a discrimination claim under Title VII must first file a claim with
the EEOC, which conducts an initial investigation. If the EEOC determines there is “reasonable
cause to believe the charge is true,” it may file a claim on the party’s behalf or issue a right to sue
letter permitting the party to pursue her claim in court. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)–(f) (2006).
57. It is possible to extend the spectrum beyond the class action mechanism to include qui tam
actions in which the private recovery of relators allows even individuals to assume collective
responsibility for pursuing public harms. See, e.g., Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States
ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 773–74 (2000) (noting “the long tradition of qui tam actions in
England and the American Colonies,” and affirming relator’s standing to bring suit based on
injury to the United States).
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While no private action operates truly independent of the state—the
locus is courts and private enforcement of legal norms—what is critical
in this domain is that the moving agent regarding any particular claim of
harm is a private actor rather than a state regulator or prosecutor. Such
private enforcement is particularly alluring in common law systems that
depend on ex-post liability to police market activity, as opposed to more
rigid regulatory review as a condition of market entry. 58
Once after-the-fact civil liability becomes a major source of
regulatory oversight, there is no necessary reason for the state to be the
lead enforcement agent. In responding to discrete injuries, the active
agents can easily be private actors representing claimants for alleged
misconduct that may emerge as the driving force in both establishing
liability and obtaining relief. 59 Indeed, in describing the trend in
Europe toward greater avenues of aggregate litigation, Fabrizio Cafaggi
and Hans Micklitz specifically tie the role of collective litigation to
different regulatory strategies: “Shifting enforcement from ex ante to ex
post may permit entry liberalization, leaving pre-market authorization
only for specific and riskier products or services.” 60
Thus, the class action in many areas of law is the private alternative
to government enforcement; that is, the mechanism that allows the
flexibility of the common law to operate instead of more formal
command and control regulation. Private enforcement mechanisms play
a role in the operation of what may be termed “regulating after the fact,”
the system of ex-post accountability that is the hallmark of the common
law. The expansive role of civil litigation in the U.S., contrasted with
greater formal regulation in much of the developed economic world, is
part and parcel of a commitment of private regulatory enforcement.61
58. See Samuel Issacharoff, Regulating after the Fact, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 375, 377–78
(2007) (emphasizing the “centrality of ex post regulation” in the American legal system).
59. Ex-ante regulation is most effective when potential harms are predictable and precautions
easily ascertained. Enforcement through ex-post liability is better suited to circumstances where
potential harms are variable or available precautions uncertain. See Samuel Issacharoff & Ian
Samuel, The Institutional Dimension of Consumer Protection, in NEW FRONTIERS OF CONSUMER
PROTECTION: THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT 47, 50–53
(Fabrizio Cafaggi & Hans-W. Micklitz eds., 2009) (proposing a typology to explain the
relationship between public and private, and ex-post and ex-ante, regulation).
60. Fabrizio Cafaggi & Hans-W. Micklitz, Introduction, in NEW FRONTIERS OF CONSUMER
PROTECTION, supra note 59, at 1, 8.
61. Richard L. Marcus, Reform through Rulemaking?, 80 WASH. U. L. Q. 901, 907 (2002),
http://lawreview.wustl.edu/inprint/80-3/p901Marcusbookpages.pdf (“[T]he American tendency to
litigate about topics that are handled without litigation in other societies is not pathological, but
rather a logical consequence of the American method of providing activist government without a
centralized bureaucracy. On the positive side, it can provide remarkable protections on the
initiative of a few, including the dispossessed; those who champion the remedial potential of
adversary legalism are right.”).
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In important areas of consumer law and economic damages, as with
securities fraud, the private class action overcomes the distinct
disabilities of public enforcement: the problem of insufficient resources,
the risk of regulatory capture, and the proclivity toward rigidity of
formal regulation in markets that require innovation and speed of
change. 62
The difference between a fixed, preexisting consumer organization or
other state-licensed enterprise and the flexible use of the class action
reflects long-standing divisions in economic organization. If we go
back one thousand years to the rise of Venice as a major trading power,
one sees the importance of single-venture economic organizations to
capitalize on entrepreneurial initiative and harness active agents to the
needs of more passive principals. As told in the compelling account by
Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, Venice pioneered the use of the
commenda, “a rudimentary type of joint stock company, which formed
only for the duration of a single trading mission.” 63 A commenda
“involved two partners, a ‘sedentary’ one who stayed in Venice and one
who traveled. The sedentary partner put capital into the venture, while
the traveling partner accompanied the cargo.” 64 Acemoglu and
Robinson praise the commenda for unleashing new uses of investment
capital and for preventing the stultifying effects of permanent state
monopolies on trade or enterprise. 65
One can find many parallels between the single-undertaking joint
ventures of old and the modern class action as developed in the U.S.
Unlike the fixed creation of a government agency, or even the licensing
of a single actor such as a designated consumer organization or some
other NGO, the class action is transactionally limited. It exists for the
limited purpose of pursuing a common set of claims among people who
typically have no prior and no subsequent relation to each other. The
result is mutually beneficial temporary alliances, as with the commenda,
but with no institutional permanence beyond the single undertaking.
The class action fits well in American law precisely because of its
separation from formal state control. In part, the centrality of class
actions in areas such as consumer protection reflects a generalized
62. Samuel Issacharoff, Group Litigation of Consumer Claims: Lessons from the U.S.
Experience, 34 TEX. INT’L L.J. 135, 137–42 (1999).
63. DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL: THE ORIGINS OF
POWER, PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY 152 (2012).
64. Id. at 152–53.
65. Id. at 153. Acemoglu and Robinson attribute the atrophying of Venice in part to the
elimination of flexible economic organizations, such as the commenda, in favor of fixed state
licenses, a process that promoted capture by established economic actors and that in turn led to
economic stagnation. Id. at 153–56.
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common law approach to incremental regulation through evolving
standards of care, similar to the growth of product liability law in the
twentieth century. 66 The class action is a procedural device that
responds to two obstacles that may frustrate the proper functioning of
common law accountability. First, as already discussed, the prospect of
collective prosecution serves as a litigation-inducing device through the
coordination of small-value claims. Not only does it make collective
prosecution possible, but it also allows for potential complete resolution
of all claims, thereby saving on the transaction costs of repeat litigation
and offering the prospect of a “global peace” 67 premium in exchange
for a complete release of all claims against defendants. 68 Second,
following the 1966 reforms to Rule 23, class actions proved particularly
well suited to economic harm claims arising from impersonal markets
for mass produced goods and services. In so doing, class actions
bridged a critical gap between limited contractual remedies for the mass
of affected consumers and the redress available to the subset of
claimants whose physical injuries would place them within the reach of
tort law, as in pharmaceutical cases. 69
But focusing only on the litigation features of the class action would
understate the major feature of private litigation in mass markets.
Returning to President Lorenzetti’s initial account of the role of the
class action, what stands out in this form of private action is the
introduction of multiple actors into legal enforcement, a form of
regulatory pluralism. This role is captured in part by the account of
66. For a discussion on the evolution of products liability, see MARK A. GEISTFELD,
PRINCIPLES OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 9–26 (2006); William Powers, Jr., Is There a Doctrinal
Answer to the Question of Generic Liability?, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 169, 172–73 (1996) (noting
that section 402a of the Restatement of Torts paved the ground for modern products liability law
through its case-by-case adoption).
67. See Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 310 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[W]ere we to mandate
that a class include only those alleging ‘colorable’ claims, we would effectively rule out the
ability of a defendant to achieve ‘global peace’ by obtaining releases from all those who might
wish to assert claims, meritorious or not.”).
68. In this sense, class action settlements overcome not only the commons problem of public
goods, but the negative commons problem arising from the inability to coordinate fractionated
interests in a common asset. For an incisive discussion of this element of the “peace premium”
in class resolution of common claims, see D. Theodore Rave, Governing the Anticommons in
Non-Class Aggregate Settlements 7–9 (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 12-42, June 28, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2122877 (noting that “defendants are sometimes willing to pay a
premium for total peace” to avoid adverse selection effects, reduce uncertainty, and minimize
transaction costs).
69. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.01 (2010)
(noting that class actions may be more effective in addressing “economic injuries from a
generally applicable course of conduct” than “personal injuries” where common issues are
generally not as prevalent).
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class action plaintiffs as private attorneys general. However, the private
attorney general model is limited in implying that the only role of the
class action suit is to fill the gap for lack of public resources. Offering a
rival actor who can challenge regulatory failure is not simply a response
to the benign fact of constrained capacity, but represents a deeper
concern about the misdirection of public resources.
Class actions then play a central regulatory role because of their
independence from formal state channels. From this perspective, the
purpose of the class action is to be a rival to the enforcement powers of
state actors so as to serve as a check on the misuse of public authority.
Mass markets are prone to the concentrated interests of the repeat actor
overwhelming the diffuse interests of small-time actors. The effect is
not just a matter of different litigation incentives, but of the
disproportionate political pressure that concentrated minorities are
likely to exert. 70 On this view, private suit enforcement through a class
action is not just a matter of equalizing litigation resources. Rather, the
critical issue is having diverse sources of oversight of markets with
asymmetric stakes between engaged repeat actors and passive
consumers. The greater the number of potential regulatory enforcement
agents, the less likely the prospect of the regulator being captured by the
superior resources and incentives of the regulated. The trade-off,
however, is that there is less public accountability to the form of
regulatory enforcement, and that the extent of regulation is largely
determined by the economic incentives facing private actors, rather than
the formalities of political decision making.
This potential for the class action to serve as an enforcement device
independent of state authorities is the feature of class action law that is
most likely to engender strenuous opposition from institutional actors.
Any mass marketer of goods or services would rather face the limited
resources and attention of the individual consumer, whether in the
limited domain of one-on-one dispute resolution, or even in the political
arena. To speak of class actions as “leveling the playing field” 71 is not
70. This is the classic public choice account of why minority factions can extract
disproportionate returns from the political process. For an early formulation of public choice
theory, see WILLIAM H. RIKER, THE THEORY OF POLITICAL COALITIONS (1962). On the superior
ability of organized minorities to advance their interests, see MANCUR OLSON JR., THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 143 (1965) (“The multitude
of workers, consumers, white-collar workers, farmers, and so on are organized only in special
circumstances, but business interests are organized as a general rule.”). For a comprehensive
overview of the public choice literature, see Steven Croley, Interest Groups and Public Choice, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 49, 49–80 (Daniel A. Farber &
Anne Joseph O’Connell eds., 2010).
71. See Samuel Issacharoff, Assembling Class Actions, WASH U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012)
(manuscript at 13) (on file with author).
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only a matter of balancing the strengths of the relative litigation
interests but of the deeper concern that absent some form of
independent collective redress, wrongdoing will likely go undetected
and unchallenged.
Perhaps not surprisingly, many of the most important battles of
current class action case law in the U.S. are being waged in the domain
where the class action is a primary mechanism of independent challenge
to mass-scale wrongdoing. This is the issue of moment in the domain
of consumer law, where the asymmetries of scale between mass
marketers and individuals allow the former to control standard form
contracting. Across a range of services, such as cell phones and credit
cards, and increasingly in the employment context, standard form
contracts now prohibit the accepting party from seeking redress as part
of a class action and force any individual dispute into individual
arbitrations. 72
The leading cases in this area, most notably AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, 73 turn on the preemptive force of the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA) in preventing state law interference with the effort to disable
private enforcement. 74 So long as the consumer contracts are generated
in a state that recognizes the enforceability of such waivers, the FAA
then serves to preclude any other state remedies. 75 Some cases, with
Concepcion again the most notable, have looked to the practical

72. Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the
Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 379 (2005) (predicting that collective action
waivers, if permitted to proliferate, will ultimately result in “the near-total demise of the modern
class action.”); Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV.
1631, 1638–39 (2005) (noting the ubiquity of mandatory arbitration clauses in contracts of
adhesion); Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming
2013) (manuscript at 62–63), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2038985 (describing collective
action waivers as a substantial impediment to negative value class action suits).
73. 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts
California’s common law unconscionability rule barring class action waivers in contracts of
adhesion).
74. Two earlier cases both involved contracts that were silent on the question of class-wide
arbitration. In Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, a plurality of justices held that the FAA
empowers the arbitrator—not the state court—to determine whether a contract may be read as
permitting class-wide arbitration. 539 U.S. 444, 447 (2003). The Supreme Court went a step
further in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., concluding that “a party may not be
compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis,”
thereby superseding the background rules of individual states. 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1763 (2010). See
also Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 347–48 (2008) (finding that the FAA preempts a California
state law requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to arbitration).
75. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995) (emphasizing that
“[s]tates may regulate contracts, including arbitration clauses, under general contract law
principles” but “[may not] place arbitration clauses on an unequal ‘footing’”).
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effectiveness of the arbitration forum. 76 But this is the exception, and
the grant of strong preemptive power to the FAA has given the
requirement of private arbitration the imprimatur of the supremacy of
federal law.
To date, most efforts to resist mandatory arbitration have fallen into
the trap of asking whether the quality of the underlying consumer
agreement as a contract of adhesion made the terms unconscionable.77
The individualist premise of the unconscionability doctrine does not
engage the regulatory role played by class actions in areas of law poorly
overseen by state authorities. Indeed, only a handful of cases have
addressed the legal enforceability of compelled individual arbitration in
terms of the effectiveness of the overall regulatory scheme, primarily in
the context of federal law where the state-federal issues of the FAA do
not obtain. 78
At present, it is precisely where public enforcement is difficult,
compromised, captured, or under-resourced that the flexibility and the
entrepreneurial drive behind the class action are most decisive and most
significant. And, not surprisingly, it is there that the political economy
76. The contract at issue in Concepcion specified that AT&T would “pay all costs for nonfrivolous claims”; guaranteed a minimum recovery of $7,500 plus double attorney fees should the
final award exceed AT&T’s settlement offer; and permitted plaintiffs to choose whether to
arbitrate “in person, by telephone, or based only on submissions.” Owing to these generous
terms, the Supreme Court observed that “consumers who were members of a class would likely
be worse off.” 131 S. Ct. at 1744–45. But see In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., 667 F.3d 204,
218 (2d Cir. 2012) (finding that a class action waiver could not be enforced because the costs of
individual arbitration would effectively preclude plaintiffs from bringing their antitrust claims),
cert. granted sub nom. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 2012 WL 3096737 (U.S. Nov. 9,
2012) (No. 12-133).
77. See, e.g., Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005) (holding that
class action waivers in contracts of adhesion are unconscionable in circumstances where “the
party with the superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large
numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money”), abrogated by Concepcion, 131
S. Ct. at 1753.
78. The leading example is the Second Circuit’s decision in a federal antitrust action. See In
re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., 667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom. Am. Express
Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 2012 WL 3096737 (U.S. Nov. 9, 2012) (No. 12-133). The court
specifically found that a successful antitrust action would require expenditures approaching one
million dollars just for the expert econometrics necessary to prosecute any claim, something that
no individual litigant would ever rationally pursue in arbitration or any other individual case. Id.
at 217–18. By contrast, in CompuCredit, the Supreme Court upheld a class action waiver in the
face of what appeared to be a statutory commitment to the availability of full court protection.
CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 669–70 (2012) (holding that a provision of the
Credit Repair Organization Act (CROA) mandating disclosure of consumers’ “right to sue” does
not preclude enforcement of a mandatory arbitration clause). Only Justice Ginsburg argued the
importance of private enforcement to effectuate the statutory scheme. See id. at 678 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting) (noting that the Court’s decision reduces plaintiffs’ right to sue to a far less
meaningful right “to seek, or defend against, court enforcement of an award rendered by the
arbitrator chosen by the credit repair organization”).
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of resistance by institutional actors is most acute. The most contested
arena of class action law is where the private enforcement action
substitutes for or displaces public enforcement for reasons that are not
difficult to divine. That fact alone speaks to the importance and
complexity of private class action law.
CONCLUSION
At the heart of the modern class action is the creation of a private
form of collective authority standing relatively independent of the state.
The independence can yield an effective mechanism to challenge state
conduct, to assist the state without swelling the permanent ranks of
enforcement administration, and even to police potential misconduct by
state actors vested with exclusive enforcement authority. As ably
summarized by Judge Scirica of the Third Circuit:
The class action device and the concept of the private attorney general
are powerful instruments of social and economic policy. Despite
inherent tensions, they have proven efficacious in resolving mass
claims when courts have insisted on structural, procedural, and
substantive fairness. Among the goals are redress of injuries,
procedural due process, efficiency, horizontal equity among injured
claimants, and finality. 79

Part of the allure of class actions is that they can offer these benefits
more flexibly and often more efficiently than can the state. That raises
the question, particularly as more civil law countries are experimenting
with private enforcement, of their relation to the traditional reliance on
direct state regulatory authority. The promised benefits correspond to a
deeper commitment to regulatory pluralism, one that recognizes not
only the gains that might be realized through private enforcement, but
the risks associated with excessive reliance on exclusive state regulatory
power. 80

79. Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 340 (3d Cir. 2011) (Scirica, J., concurring).
80. My colleague Arthur Miller powerfully makes the point about the deregulatory impulse
behind the private attorney general model:
Even though private lawsuits might be viewed as an inefficient ex post method of
enforcing public policies, they have dispersed regulatory authority; achieved greater
transparency; provided a source of compensation, deterrence, and institutional
governance; and led to leaner government involvement. Without this privateattorneys-general concept, the substitution of an alternative methodology would be
necessary. This probably would mean the establishment of the type of continentalstyle, centralized bureaucracies and administrative enforcement that many think are
inconsistent with our culture and heritage.
Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal, supra note 45, at 6.

